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WHAT CAN BE DONE IN DARFUR? 
Killing zone 
by Sandra E Joireman 
CHRISTIANS FROM all tradi-tions and from across the po-litical spectrum have been pressing President Bush to 
try to get more United Nations peace-
keeping troops on the ground in Dar-
fur to stop the unrelenting violence 
there. The National Council of 
Churches endorsed the UN resolution 
in August that called for sending UN 
troops. In October, Evangelicals for 
Darfur, a coalition of Christian lead-
ers—including Richard Land of the 
Southern Baptist Convention and Jim 
Wallis of Sojourners—took out full-
page ads in newspapers calling for 
President Bush to do more to address 
the crisis. 
But violence against civilians con-
tinues, and the Sudanese govern-
ment remains opposed to allowing 
UN troops in the region. The Darfur 
region is located in the western part 
of Sudan along the border with 
Chad. Darfur, which means "the 
kingdom of the Fur," is the size of 
Texas. 
The current conflict began in 2002 
when two rebel groups, the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Jus-
tice and Equality Movement (JEM), 
began attacking government targets 
because of the Khartoum govern-
ment's perceived discrimination 
against African ethnic groups such as 
the Fur, Massaleit and Zagawha. The 
conflict is rooted in local struggles 
over land and water between the no-
madic "Arabs" and the land-tilling 
"Africans." 
The categories of Arab and African 
are rather arbitrary, however. There 
have been decades of intermarriage 
between the two groups, both of 
which are Muslim. A split within the 
government of Sudan in 2000 over the 
correct expression of political Islam 
led to the declaration of a state of 
emergency and fueled violence be-
tween the two groups. 
Under the state of emergency the 
Sudanese government used its ex-
panded authority to retaliate against 
the uprising in Darfur. The govern-
ment pays local militias, in this case 
the Janjaweed, to lead attacks on civil-
ians in coordination with government 
aircraft. Though the government de-
nies arming the Janjaweed, there have 
long been reports of coordinated at-
tacks. This method worked very well 
for the government as a low-cost 
method of handling the armed rebel-
lion during the civil war between the 
north and south that lasted from 1983 
to 2005. 
The goal of the government-
backed fighters appears to be as much 
to displace the population as to stifle 
the rebellion. The BBC reports that 
over 200,000 have been killed; some 
sources claim that the figure is as high 
as 400,000. Two million people have 
fled their homes, with some crossing 
into Chad and destabilizing that coun-
try. Rape and sexual violence against 
women and girls caught in the conflict 
have been rampant. Women are often 
attacked when they leave refugee 
camps to search for firewood or water. 
It is difficult even to estimate how 
many women have been raped or 
killed. 
Since 2004 the African Union has 
deployed 7,700 troops in Darfur. (Its 
noteworthy that Rwanda was one of 
the countries to send soldiers.) This 
force has been grossly insufficient to 
protect civilians. Only 1,400 of the 
African Union troops are engaged in 
policing. 
In May a peace deal was negotiated in Nigeria between the SLA and the 
Sudanese government, but the agree-
ment quickly fell apart. Fighting be-
tween government-backed forces and 
factions of the now-splintered SLA 
and JEM has since been on the rise. 
In August a UN Security Council 
resolution extended the mandate of 
UN forces in Sudan to Darfur. (A con-
tingent of UN peacekeepers was origi-
nally empowered to enter the country 
to enforce the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement of 2005, which ended the 
conflict between northern and south-
ern Sudan.) The August resolution 
calls for deploying 17,300 additional 
peacekeepers to Darfur, including 16 
police units. 
But Sudan s government objects to 
the sending of peacekeeping troops 
to Darfur. Omar Al-Bashir, the presi-
dent of Sudan, has referred to the 
UN force as a "recolonization" effort, 
and the government has told African 
and Arab countries that if they con-
tribute troops to a peacekeeping 
force, Sudan would regard that as "a 
hostile act." 
The International Crisis Group, a 
well-respected independent think 
tank, has argued that "full-scale non-
consensual military intervention by 
the international community is not at 
this stage a defensible or realistic op-
tion." The ICG has proposed, as an al-
ternative, a series of actions to in-
crease the pressure on the Sudanese 
government. These recommendations 
include freezing the assets of govern-
ment officials involved in the genocide 
and subjecting them to international 
travel bans. 
The ICG also advocates hiring 
forensic accountants to locate offshore 
accounts of Sudan's ruling National 
Congress Party, which could be frozen 
if economic sanctions were to take ef-
fect; examining options for restricting 
investment in Sudan s oil industry; and 
planning for a no-fly zone over Darfur. 
It is hoped that such actions would 
pressure the government of Sudan to 
accede to the Security Council resolu-
tion. 
The ICG recommendations are 
constructive suggestions for altering 
the position of the Sudanese govern-
ment. The U.S. should endorse 
these actions and should implement 
a no-fly zone over Darfur as soon as 
possible. Neighboring Chad is in-
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creasingly unstable, and the U.S. 
should support the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops along the bor-
der between Chad and Sudan to try 
and limit the geographical spread of 
the conflict. 
Now that the midterm elections are 
over, churches and individuals should 
press the president and elected repre-
sentatives to address the Darfur geno-
cide both in speeches and in action, 
supporting a no-fly zone over Darfur 
and intervention by the UN in both 
Darfur and Chad. •
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